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Abstract
Following atrocities against the minority Muslim Rohingya population by the 
Myanmar military, several states have imposed sanctions and deployed international 
justice strategies against the Myanmar government. In contrast, Indonesia has 
used an alternative ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, focused on aid delivery to affected 
communities and cooperation with Myanmar. The paper presents one of the first 
empirical examinations of Indonesia’s role, and considers Indonesia’s approach from 
a realpolitik perspective to show why Indonesia has avoided R2P measures. The paper 
identifies three factors that shaped Indonesia’s approach: Islamic humanitarianism, 
Indonesia’s own experience of managing civil–military relations during a contested 
democratic transition, and its continued commitment to core asean principles. The 
paper also contributes to wider debates by identifying some of the limitations of R2P, 
especially in terms of how R2P can be sidelined by national and regional diplomatic 
priorities, in this case manifested in the quiet diplomacy approach.
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – Myanmar – Indonesia – Rohingya – Islamic 
humanitarianism – quiet diplomacy – civil-military relations – asean
Successive waves of military-led atrocities against the ethnic Rohingya popu-
lation, a Muslim minority in Myanmar, have created the gravest political and 
humanitarian crisis in twenty-first-century Asia.1 The United Nations (UN) 
estimates that since the violence escalated in 2017, over 700,000 Rohingya 
have been forced over the border into Bangladesh,2 with more than 126,000 
displaced internally3 and thousands more fleeing in boats across the region. 
The UN Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (ffmm) 
established that the incidents in Rakhine State from 25 August 2017 amounted 
to international atrocity crimes.4 Despite the ineffectiveness of international 
responses to the atrocities throughout the 2010s, the majority of research has 
focused on analysing the actions of the UN and Western states, and the role of 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (oic) in bringing a case of genocide 
against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (icj).
In contrast, limited research has considered the role of neighbour-
ing Southeast Asian states in addressing the crisis,5 despite their closer 
allegiance to Myanmar, their international commitment to R2P – the 
1 The authors wish to thank Ellen Stensrud, Martin Mennecke, Noel Morada, and one 
anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts, Amelia Fauzia and Mohamad 
Rosyidin for helpful discussions, and the anonymous contributors to the research.
2 The UN Refugee Agency, ‘Rohingya Emergency’, unhcr UK, 31 July 2019, https://www.
unhcr.org/uk/rohingya-emergency.html, accessed 12 July 2020.
3 Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar, A/hrc/42/CRP.5, 16 September 2019, p. 19.
4 ibid., p. 72.
5 Key exceptions include Lina Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’, 
The Pacific Review, 25(1) 51–74 (2012); Alistair D. B. Cook and S. Nathini, Pathways for 
ASEAN Contributions to Sustainable Peace and Security in Rakhine State, Myanmar, 
irb-2017-08-018-01, May 2020; Amelia Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State, Myanmar: 
Islamic Humanitarianism, Soft Diplomacy, and the Question of Inclusive Aid’, Oxford 
Department of International Development, 31 January 2018, https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/blog/
indonesian-aid-rakhine-state-myanmar-islamic-humanitarianism-soft-diplomacy-and-
question, accessed 23 June 2020; Noel M. Morada, ‘Continuing Violence and Atrocities 
in Rakhine since 2017: Beyond the Outrage, Failures of the International Community’, 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 12(1) 64–85 (2020); Noel M. Morada, ‘asean and the 
Rakhine Crisis: Balancing Non-Interference, Accountability, and Strategic Interests in 
Responding to Atrocities in Myanmar’, Global Responsibility to Protect [this issue]; and 
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main international norm shaping atrocity prevention responses – and their 
critical role in protecting exiled Rohingya. In this paper, we seek to redress that 
balance by analysing the main factors that have shaped Indonesia’s response. 
Our analysis builds on the emerging body of work by Southeast Asian and 
regional scholars, but contributes a unique assessment of the factors influ-
encing Indonesia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Myanmar. To do so, we draw on 
data from policy reports, UN documents, media outlets, original key informant 
interviews, and academic literature.
Initially, the international expectations on Indonesia to challenge Myanmar 
over its treatment of the Rohingya were high. As home to the world’s largest 
Muslim majority, a close ally of Myanmar, a relatively established democ-
racy, a regional power with a global role as part of the G20, and a non-perma-
nent seat on the UN Security Council (2019–2020), Indonesia stood to play a 
critical role in responding to the atrocities. Indonesia had committed to the 
R2P principle at the UN,6 and publicly supported the findings of the ffmm.7 
Furthermore, both national secular human rights organisations and Islamic 
organisations – from large moderate Islamic social movements to smaller mil-
itant groups8 – lobbied the government to protect the Rohingya from further 
violence and provide them with humanitarian assistance.9 While attempting 
Mohamad Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty with Global Norms: Indonesia’s Quiet 
Diplomacy in Myanmar and the Feasibility of the Implementation of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) in Southeast Asia’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 12(1) 11–36 (2020).
6 A/72/PV.105, 2 July 2018, pp. 6–7. See also Indonesia’s statements at unga debates on 8 
September 2014 and 2015, https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/, accessed 23 November 
2020.
7 Mouayed Saleh, Report of the Human Rights Council, A/hrc/S-27/3, 1 February 2018, p. 7; 
unga Res. 72/248, 23 January 2018.
8 Amelia Fauzia, ‘Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia: Modernization, Islamisation, and 
Social Justice’, American Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(2) 223–236 (2017); 
Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’; Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic 
Humanitarianism?’, Korean Journal of Humanitarian Law, 33 60–80 (2013); Euronews, 
‘Indonesia’s Muslims Urge More Support for Myanmar’s Rohingyas’, 16 September 2017, 
https://www.euronews.com/2017/09/16/indonesias-muslims-urge-more-support-for-
myanmars-rohingyas, accessed 5 July 2020; Gurjit Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s 
Foreign Policy’, ORF, 24 June 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/islam-role-
indonesia-foreign-policy-68410/, accessed 5 July 2020.
9 Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 70; Deasy Silvya Sari, Taufik 
Hidayat, and Aliyuna Pratisti, ‘Indonesian Government Policy on Rohingya Refugees’, 
Andalas Journal of International Studies, 7(1) 1–13 (2018), p. 8; Fardah Assegaf, ‘A Deep 
Sense of Humanity for Rohingya Prevails in Aceh’, Antara News, 1 July 2020, https://
en.antaranews.com/news/151598/a-deep-sense-of-humanity-for-rohingya-prevails-in-
aceh, accessed 13 July 2020.
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to maintain close diplomatic relations with Myanmar, Indonesia responded 
to these domestic political pressures. Over 1,800 Rohingya refugees were 
eventually accepted into Aceh Province, and the government facilitated aid 
via asean and Indonesian humanitarian organisations into Rakhine State.10 
Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also repeatedly urged Myanmar to minimise 
the use of force and enable humanitarian access to Rakhine State.11
However, despite the pushes for Indonesia to use its advantageous posi-
tion, particularly from national human rights and Islamic organisations, we 
identify two key factors that restrained Indonesia’s foreign policy over the 
atrocities. We find that Indonesia’s recent political transition from a military 
regime – including the government’s recent experiences of managing civ-
il–military relations, and multiple ethno-nationalist conflict sites – informed 
a sense of a shared political history with Myanmar. This perspective tempered 
Indonesia’s approach. Further, as a secular multi-ethnic state with a strong 
adherence to the ‘asean Way’ – especially the principles of non-interference 
and consensus-based decision-making12 – Indonesia sought to avoid an inter-
national perception of pro-Muslim bias against Myanmar.13 Indonesia’s cau-
tious approach caused tensions with the oic,14 for example, when Indonesia 
called for restraint towards Myanmar, in contrast with the critical position 
taken by Malaysia, another asean and oic member.15
Indonesia’s middle-way diplomatic path, dubbed ‘quiet’ or ‘soft’ diplo-
macy,16 evolved through the 2010s. In 2012, Indonesia engaged with multilat-
eral fora, particularly the oic, which it perceived as having a vital role to play 
in the crisis. However, during President Jokowi’s first term (2014–2019), as the 
10 Sari et al., ‘Indonesian Government Policy’, p. 4. See also Krithika Varagur, ‘“They Are Our 
Brothers”: Rohingya Refugees Find Rare Welcome in Aceh’, The Guardian, 25 May 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/25/they-are-our-brothers-rohingya-
refugees-find-rare-welcome-in-aceh, accessed 1 July 2020.
11 Yashinta Difa and Azis Kurmala, ‘Indonesia Gives Grant of Rp7.5 Billion to Help Myanmar 
Refugees’, Antara News, 20 December 2019, https://en.antaranews.com/news/138508/
indonesia-gives-grant-of-rp75-billion-to-help-myanmar-refugees, accessed 15 July 2020. 
See also Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’.
12 On asean’s capacity to respond to human rights protection issues see Noel Morada, 
‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human 
Protection: An Overview’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 8(2–3) 111–132 (2016); for a 
detailed definition of the ‘asean Way’ see p. 117.
13 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
14 Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’.
15 Morada, ‘asean and the Rakhine Crisis’; Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 32.
16 Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 15. See also Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to 
Rakhine State’.
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oic became more critical of Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya, Indonesia 
distanced itself, stating that a more ‘constructive’ diplomatic approach was 
needed, centred on aid provision.17 The Indonesian government subsequently 
focused on bilateral and regional channels to deal with the crisis, maintaining 
what it described as an ‘open door’ while ‘building trust’ with the Myanmar 
government.18
Rather than invoking R2P, Indonesia framed its approach to atrocity pre-
vention as part of a long-term strategic relationship with Myanmar. Foreign 
Ministry officials argued that to support Myanmar’s democratisation pro-
cess required cooperation with the government and the military during the 
Rohingya crisis, avoiding overt demands for political and military reforms.19 
Such an approach was already embedded in the way Indonesia had managed 
ethno-nationalist conflict domestically during its own transition, a model 
dubbed ‘illiberal peacebuilding’. This approach, found across democratic and 
semi-democratic Asian states,20 focuses on socio-economic recovery, eco-
nomic development, and technical reforms, rather than addressing political 
and civil issues, such as the expansion of citizenship and other rights to vulner-
able minority groups. For the Rohingya, citizenship lay at the heart of the cri-
sis. However, from Indonesia’s perspective, directly addressing the citizenship 
issue with Myanmar risked further conflict and pushing Myanmar towards 
an even more hard-line position. An illiberal peacebuilding approach instead 
offered a way both to balance civilian and military factions within a regime, 
but without alienating military elites, and to achieve overall order during a 
contested political transition.21
Indonesia’s hesitation to invoke R2P over Myanmar’s treatment of the 
Rohingya also derived from the possibility of non-cooperative international 
17 Eko Prasetyo, ‘Indonesia Calls on oic to Improve Situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’, 
Jakarta Globe, 20 January 2017, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-calls-on-oic-to-
improve-situation-in-myanmars-rakhine-state/, accessed 18 August 2020; Institute for 
Policy Analysis of Conflict (ipac), Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, ipac Report No. 46, 
29 June 2018, p. 4.
18 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020. See also, 
Fauzia, ‘Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia’, p. 230; Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s 
Foreign Policy’.
19 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
20 Claire Q. Smith, Lars Waldorf, Rajesh Venugopal, and Gerard McCarthy, ‘Illiberal 
Peace-Building in Asia: A Comparative Overview’, Conflict, Security & Development, 
20(1): 1–14 (2020).
21 ibid.; Claire Q. Smith, ‘Illiberal Peace-Building in Hybrid Political Orders: Managing 
Violence during Indonesia’s Contested Political Transition’, Third World Quarterly, 35(8): 
1509–1528 (2014).
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intervention via pillar three. The prospect of united international condemna-
tion, an international sanctions regime, or the use of collective force mandated 
through a UN Security Council resolution, in response to Myanmar’s treatment 
of the Rohingya, remained unlikely throughout the 2010s. But the impact of 
precisely such actions in Indonesia over East Timor 20 years earlier should not 
be underestimated. Despite rising pressure from influential Islamic groups for 
a stronger government stance on protecting Rohingya human rights, Jokowi’s 
government maintained the quiet diplomacy approach and avoided R2P.
The following sections explore these pushes towards and pulls away from 
greater action over the atrocities in Myanmar. First, we consider the extent 
to which Indonesia’s approach was influenced by international and domestic 
calls to protect the Rohingya according to R2P. We find that despite the govern-
ment’s international commitment to R2P, it did not shape Indonesian foreign 
policy towards Myanmar. Second, we discuss how, while R2P influenced civil 
society organisations in Indonesia, the advocacy of Islamic humanitarianism 
by Islamic organisations held more sway and eventually persuaded the govern-
ment to take (limited) action. Third, we outline the influences of Indonesia’s 
domestic democratisation experiences, including managing civil–military 
relations during the transition from a military regime, the legacies of UN 
intervention in East Timor, and enduring ethno-nationalist conflict in Papua. 
Fourth, we consider Indonesia’s commitment to asean and its core values, 
which acted as another important brake on public criticism of and interven-
tion in Myanmar. To conclude, we reflect on whether quiet diplomacy and R2P 
can be reconciled, and propose that R2P debates need to take more account 
of domestic and regional constraints when assessing the potential of invoking 
the doctrine.
1 Domestic Calls for Atrocity Prevention
Civil society organisations in Indonesia pressured the government to take 
action over the Rohingya crisis throughout the 2010s, with some secular 
human rights groups invoking R2P.22 Indonesia was part of the asean call 
for an impartial investigation into atrocities in Rakhine by the Independent 
Commission of Enquiry (ICoE),23 voted in support of the United Nations 
General Assembly (unga) resolutions in 2017 and 2019 adopting the reports of 
22 Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’.
23 asean, Chairman’s Statement of the 33rd asean Summit, 13 November 2018, p. 13.
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the special rapporteurs on human rights violations in Myanmar,24 and vocally 
supported R2P at the General Assembly.25 As such, national human rights 
organisations emphasised Indonesia’s stated international commitments.
For example, in an open letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KontraS 
– one of the most influential human rights organisations in Indonesia – urged 
the government to actively respond to crimes against humanity in Rakhine 
State.26 KontraS drew on R2P to emphasise the importance of existing inter-
national mechanisms to protect the Rohingya. One KontraS activist argued 
that the Myanmar government was bound by international law and should 
uphold universal values.27 In an open letter, the spokesperson pressed for the 
Indonesian government to conduct ‘humanitarian interventions’ via the ‘R2P 
mechanism’, especially actions relating to pillar one,28 hinting at cooperative 
measures rather than non-cooperative interventions. The KontraS letter high-
lighted that Myanmar’s membership in asean should be used by other asean 
states – such as Indonesia – to exert R2P pressures. However, as the third and 
fourth sections outline, Indonesia was unwilling to challenge the asean norm 
of non-interference over the Rohingya.
Human rights organisations in Indonesia also worked collectively on the 
Rohingya issue. From 2009, the Indonesian Human Rights Watch Group 
(hrwg), together with KontraS, Imparsial, and Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum Indonesia (ylbhi) – the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation – formed a 
human rights collective to urge the government to move away from the asean 
non-intervention principle.29 These civil society organisations appealed to the 
government, imploring them to act in accordance with international human 
rights and humanitarian law, with reference to R2P.30 In a 2017 press release, 
the organisation ylbhi invoked R2P and unga Resolution 60/1 in calling on 
the government to take action.31
24 A/72/PV.76, 23 December 2017, p. 7; A/74/PV.52, 19 December 2019, p. 34.
25 A/72/PV.105, 2 July 2018, pp. 6–7.
26 Yati Andriyani, ‘Open Letter: Urge to Resolve Crimes against Humanity in Rakhine, 





29 Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 66.
30 Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (ylbhi), ‘Myanmar Needs to Immediately 
End Persecution Against Rohingya’, Press Release No. 119/SK/P-YLBHI/VIII/2017, 2 
September 2017.
31 ibid.
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Regional and international ngo s also supported the R2P advocacy of 
national Indonesian ngo s. The Southeast Asian Humanitarian Committee 
(seahum) worked with activists, ngo representatives, and academics across 
the region, building networks to respond to the Rohingya crisis. In 2019, sea-
hum supported the UN’s ffmm team to investigate human rights crimes 
in Myanmar.32 National and regional ngo s, working on R2P, refugee rights, 
broader human rights, and humanitarian assistance, played a dual role: they 
lobbied the Indonesian government to take action – rather than following tra-
ditional asean values – and they also organised aid to affected communities.33
The provision of aid by Indonesian organisations was intended to mitigate the 
effects of atrocities on Rohingya communities. The government facilitated this 
aid insofar as it did not threaten diplomatic relations with Myanmar or interfere 
directly with Myanmar’s domestic policies.34 For example, when the government 
rejected Rohingya refugees in 2020, in relation to the covid-19 pandemic,35 the 
chairman of SUAKA - the Indonesian Civil Society Network for Refugee Rights 
Protection - argued that this was not an acceptable reason to reject Rohingya 
refugees,36 calling for the government to do more to protect their human rights. 
The government responded by accepting the refugees into Aceh, as this did not 
directly threaten relations with Myanmar. The following section outlines how 
Islamic organisations had greater influence on government action.
32 Yayasan Amal Malaysia, ‘3rd Annual General Meeting of Southeast Asia Humanitarian 
Committee (seahum)’, February 2019, https://www.amalmalaysia.org.my/2019/03/07/3rd-
annual-general-meeting-of-southeast-asia-humanitarian-committee-seahum/, accessed 
28 August 2020.
33 For example, the local ngo Aksi Cepat Tanggap (act) – Swift Response Action – 
supported Rohingya refugees in Aceh, alongside national organisations such as suaka – 
the Indonesian Civil Society Association for Refugee Rights Protection. See International 
Organisation for Migration (iom), ‘iom Indonesia Assists Rohingya Rescued After Four 
Months at Sea’, 26 June 2020, https://www.iom.int/news/iom-indonesia-assists-rohingya-
rescued-after-four-months-sea, accessed 28 August 2020; Assegaf, ‘A Deep Sense of 
Humanity’; Rizka Argadianti Rachmah, ‘Press Release: Rohingya Refugees: The Ultimate 
Humanity’, suaka Indonesia, 25 June 2020, https://suaka.or.id/2020/06/25/press-release-
pengungsi-rohingya-kemanusiaan-yang-utama/, accessed 28 August 2020.
34 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020. See also 
Indonesia’s statement at unga debate on 8 September 2015, https://www.globalr2p.org/
resources/statement-by-indonesia-at-the-2015-un-general-assembly-informal-interactive-
dialogue-on-the-responsibility-to-protect/, accessed 10 September 2020.
35 Rebecca Ratcliffe and Febriana Firdhaus, ‘Indonesian Villagers Defy Covid-19 Warnings 
to Rescue Rohingya Refugees’, The Guardian, 26 June 2020, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2020/jun/26/indonesian-villagers-defy-covid-19-warnings-to-rescue-rohingya-
refugees, accessed 28 August 2020.
36 Rizka Argadianti Rachmah, ‘Press Release: Rohingya Refugees’.
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2 Islamic Humanitarian Pressure to Act
We have shown how secular civil society organisations pressured the Indonesian 
government to take political and legal actions to protect the Rohingya from 
atrocities, invoking human rights and R2P principles, but this had little impact 
on government policy. Islamic civil society organisations had greater success in 
pressuring the government via appeals to Islamic humanitarianism. Although 
based on different norms, R2P and Islamic humanitarianism were similar in 
several ways.37 Both had the goal of preventing further atrocities in Rakhine 
State, and some Islamic groups also called for non-cooperative intervention.38 
Although the demands made on the Indonesian government by R2P activists 
and Islamic organisations sometimes overlapped, Islamic humanitarianism 
held more sway. While some Islamic organisations called for non-coopera-
tive intervention, the focus of most groups was on demands for humanitarian 
assistance, via both aid and refugee acceptance. National Islamic organisa-
tions also had greater political influence on the government, reflecting a much 
larger constituency than secular human rights organisations.
As a majority Muslim (although secular) state, with a large and active 
Islamic civil society, calls for Islamic solidarity and aid provision were par-
ticularly persuasive on the Indonesian government. At first, the government 
was reluctant to treat fleeing Rohingya as refugees but, following Islamic civil 
society pressure, eventually requested a safe repatriation process,39 and organ-
ised direct Rohingya refugee acceptance into Indonesia.40 On a national scale, 
Islamic humanitarian organisations advocated for Rohingya protection, both 
at home and overseas, gaining increasing traction between 2015 and 2020.41 
Islamic activism, including protests and campaigns, had support from the 
broader public.42 Additional pressure derived from rising government con-
cerns over the potential for Islamic militant action over the Rohingya crisis if 
they failed to respond.43
37 Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 35.
38 Euronews, ‘Indonesia’s Muslims’.
39 Pizaro Gozali Idrus, ‘Indonesia Urges asean to Help Ensure Rohingya Safety’, Andalou 
Agency, 24 June 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-urges-asean-to-
help-ensure-rohingya-safety/1888521#, accessed 13 July 2020. See also Assegaf, ‘A Deep 
Sense of Humanity’.
40 Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and the “Responsibility to 
Protect”’, UNHCR, no. 185 1–21 (2010), p. 8.
41 Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’.
42 ibid. See also Euronews, ‘Indonesia’s Muslims’.
43 Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’.
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At the international level, Islamic and Muslim-majority states also pres-
sured Indonesia via the oic. Initially, Indonesia looked to solve the situation in 
Rakhine State through multiple international and regional fora, with the oic 
at the forefront.44 However, when these organisations became more critical, as 
violence escalated against the Rohingya, Indonesia retreated. Jokowi’s presi-
dency instead focused on humanitarian aid and collaboration, with Indonesia 
playing a ‘bridging role’, challenging the oic when it became too intervention-
ist, and balancing domestic and regional pressures.45 The following analysis 
covers the local, national and international arenas of Islamic humanitarian-
ism in relation to Indonesian government policy towards Myanmar, assessing 
where this activism had the most influence.
2.1 Local Assistance in Aceh Province
At the grassroots level, fishing communities in Aceh repeatedly assisted Rohingya 
refugees escaping the violence in Rakhine State.46 From early 2009, Rohingya 
refugees arrived in Sabang and eastern parts of Aceh, fleeing from Bangladesh 
or directly from Myanmar.47 Locals took in large numbers of refugees following 
the waves of violence in 2012.48 Acehnese communities also rescued Rohingya 
refugees at sea in 2018 and towards the end of June 2020, despite resistance from 
local authorities on both occasions.49 The Acehnese community’s assistance to 
Rohingya refugees came from a strong sentiment of Islamic solidarity,50 with 
44 oic/ EX-CFM/2017/F.C., 19 January 2017.
45 Associated Press, ‘oic Hopes to Send Team to Myanmar to Study Rohingya’s Plight’, The 
Oklahoman, 19 January 2017, https://oklahoman.com/article/feed/1151880/oic-hopes-to-
send-team-to-myanmar-to-study-rohingyas-plight, accessed 27 August 2020.
46 Assegaf, ‘A Deep Sense of Humanity’.
47 The New Humanitarian, ‘Indonesia: Aceh Embraces Rohingya Refugees’, Refworld, 24 
February 2009, https://www.refworld.org/docid/49a660d727.html, accessed 26 August 
2020. See also Lilian Budianto, ‘ri Rescues Another 198 Boatpeople in Aceh’, The Jakarta 
Post, 4 February 2009, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/04/ri-rescues-
another-198-boatpeople-aceh.html, accessed 16 July 2020.
48 Morada, ‘Continuing Violence and Atrocities’, p. 66.
49 Max Walden and Balawyn Jones, ‘Why Aceh is a Rare Place of Welcome for Rohingya 
Refugees’, The Conversation, 25 August 2020, https://theconversation.com/why-aceh-is-a-
rare-place-of-welcome-for-rohingya-refugees-143833, accessed 26 August 2020; Sari et al., 
‘Indonesian Government Policy’, p. 4; Assegaf, ‘A Deep Sense of Humanity’.
50 Max Walden, ‘Indonesian Fishermen Praised for Rescuing Rohingya Travellers as 
Pressure Grows on asean States to Assist’, ABC News, 27 June 2020, https://www.
abc.net.au/news/2020-06-27/aceh-fishermen-praised-rohingya-refugees-indonesia-
australia/12400268, accessed 14 July 2020.
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volunteers reporting, ‘they are our Muslim brothers’.51 Following the Acehnese 
community’s response to Rohingya refugees, the Aceh provincial government 
assisted the refugees alongside national and transnational ngo s.52 Through pub-
lic donations, Muslim social and welfare organisations, such as Dompet Duafa 
and Muhammadiyah, also delivered aid and services to the refugee camps in 
Aceh.53
2.2 National Islamic Humanitarian Action
National Islamic organisations pushed the government to take stronger 
action.54 In Jakarta, thousands gathered in 2017 to protest the Rohingya situ-
ation, calling for support for their ‘Muslim brothers and sisters in Myanmar’, 
and for interreligious tolerance.55 The government faced conflicting inter-
ests when their adherence to the asean policy of non-interference clashed 
with this domestic pressure for Islamic solidarity, with influential national 
Islamic organisations growing increasingly critical of the government. A 
number of important local and national organisations in Indonesia focused 
on the Rohingya issue, including the pkpu Humanitarian Foundation and 
Dompet Dhuafa – national Zakat organisations.56 Nahdlatul Ulama (nu) and 
Muhammadiyah, the two largest moderate Islamic non-governmental organi-
sations, also played a key role.57 Together, these national Islamic organisations 
placed significant political pressure on the government, reflecting wider pub-
lic concerns about the treatment of the Rohingya minority.58
51 Varagur, ‘“They Are Our Brothers”’.
52 Sari et al., ‘Indonesian Government Policy’, p. 2.
53 Missbach, ‘Rohingya Refugees in Aceh’; Asep Setiawan and Hamka, ‘Role of Indonesian 
Humanitarian Diplomacy toward Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar’, Conference: Proceedings 
of the 2nd International Conference on Social Sciences, icss 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5–6 
November 2019.
54 Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents and Translation, 
‘Indonesia Provides Sustainable Aid for Rakhine State Refugees’, Cabinet Secretariat of 
the Republic of Indonesia, 29 January 2018, https://setkab.go.id/en/indonesia-provides-
sustainble-aid-for-rakhine-state-refugees/, accessed 26 August 2020.
55 Euronews, ‘Indonesia’s Muslims’; Ed Davies, ‘Thousands of Indonesians Join Anti-
Myanmar Rally in Jakarta’, Reuters, 6 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-myanmar-rohingya-indonesia/thousands-of-indonesians-join-anti-myanmar-rally-in-
jakarta-idUSKCN1BH0T6, accessed 28 August 2020.
56 Sari et al., ‘Indonesian Government Policy’, p. 8. Zakat is the main form of Islamic charity 
and is obligatorily managed by special state agencies – such as baznas in Indonesia, the 
national Zakat agency. See Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic Humanitarianism?’, p. 65.
57 ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, p. 9.
58 Fauzia, ‘Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia’, p. 234.
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In response, the government began registering Rohingya refugees as such, 
rather than as migrants, and eventually facilitated aid to reach the communi-
ties.59 Nonetheless, the government remained focused on maintaining diplo-
matic relations with Myanmar. When engaging with Islamic organisations and 
networks, such as the Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (akim), 
the government insisted that aid had to reach all victims of conflict in Rakhine, 
not only the Muslim Rohingya, as it was acutely aware of the sensitivities in 
Myanmar over aid going to certain groups and not others.60 Despite alliance 
donors initially preferring their aid to solely reach co-religionists,61 akim rec-
ognised that an inclusive approach enabled their access to Rakhine State.62 
The alliance eventually worked in partnership with both the Indonesian and 
Myanmar governments to provide aid.
2.3 Indonesia’s Reaction to the oic
During the earlier phases of violence against the Rohingya in 2012, the 
Indonesian government played a leading role in encouraging the oic to join a 
joint Islamic humanitarian response towards Myanmar, in collaboration with 
asean and the UN. However, as the oic’s position grew more interventionist 
and critical towards Myanmar, Indonesia pulled back.63
From its foundation, the oic was actively involved in Islamic humanitarian-
ism, establishing the Islamic Committee of the International Crescent (icic) 
to mirror the International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc).64 In 2012, 
Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono (2004–2014) called on the oic, asean, and 
the UN to jointly provide monitoring and humanitarian assistance to Rakhine 
State.65 Indonesia also raised the issue at the oic Extraordinary Summit in 
August 2012, resulting in the formation of the oic Contact Group on the 
Rohingya Muslim Minority.66 Meetings between Yudhoyono and Myanmar’s 
President Thein Sein resulted in the Myanmar government agreeing to 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and facilitating an oic delegation to visit 
59 Sari et al., ‘Indonesian Government Policy’, pp. 8–10.
60 Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’.
61 ibid.; Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic Humanitarianism?’, p. 74.
62 Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic Humanitarianism?’, p. 74; Fauzia, ‘Islamic Philanthropy in 
Indonesia’.
63 Asia News Network, ‘Indonesia Mounts Rohingya Pressure, Urges Repatriation’, Phnom 
Penh Post, 19 November 2019, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/international/indonesia-
mounts-rohingya-pressure-urges-repatriation, accessed 15 July 2020.
64 Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic Humanitarianism?’, p. 69.
65 ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, p. 2.
66 ibid.
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Rohingya refugee camps in Rakhine in August 2012.67 However, Indonesia’s 
leadership role within the oic over the Rohingya crisis then retracted under 
Jokowi’s first term as president (2014–2019).
In 2017, at an Extraordinary Meeting of the oic’s Council of Foreign 
Ministers, Retno Marsudi called on the oic to ‘develop’ its approach to the 
Rohingya crisis and to take ‘constructive and inclusive measures’.68 This 
statement reflects Indonesia’s eventual divergence from the oic’s stance.69 
Indonesia proposed that the oic should focus on humanitarian assistance for 
Rakhine State, ‘constructive engagement’ with the Myanmar government, col-
laboration with asean, and a partnership with the Islamic Development Bank 
(idb).70 This approach was partially successful, with significant idb funds 
going towards Rohingya groups,71 and underscored Indonesia’s aim of playing 
a ‘bridging role’ with the oic and Myanmar.72
However, shortly after this humanitarian-focused partnership, Jokowi’s 
government distanced itself further from the oic, unwilling to engage in the 
organisation’s increasingly vocal approach. As the asean state with the largest 
and majority Muslim population, but a secular government and a multi-eth-
nic population, Indonesia sought to avoid any perception of pro-Muslim bias 
against Myanmar. As such, Indonesia moved towards prioritising aid provision 
via bilateral and asean channels, over the oic’s multilateral and multipronged 
approach.73 Cooperation between the oic and Indonesia grew increasingly dif-
ficult, with some observers questioning Indonesia’s commitment to the oic.74
In early 2019, divergence between the oic’s more vocal approach and 
Indonesia’s quiet diplomacy reached a head, following the oic’s legal action 
against Myanmar through the icj, accusing Myanmar of international 
atrocity crimes. Indonesia was the only oic member that ‘took a different 
approach’, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.75 The Ministry stated 
that Indonesia, ‘[has] to build trust and confidence in Myanmar so that they 
want to open up to us’,76 urging the international community to stop ‘pointing 
67 ibid., p. 3.
68 oic/EX-CFM/2017/F.C., 19 January 2017; Natalia Santi, ‘Indonesia Criticizes oic on 
Rohingya’, 9 October 2018, https://en.tempo.co/read/516760/indonesia-criticizes-oic-on-
rohingya, accessed 18 July 2020; Prasetyo, ‘Indonesia Calls on oic’.
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 Islamic Development Bank (idb), Annual Report 2014, 1435H, 2014.
72 Associated Press, ‘oic Hopes to Send Team to Myanmar to Study Rohingya’s Plight’.
73 ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, p. 4.
74 Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’.
75 Asia News Network, ‘Indonesia Mounts Rohingya Pressure, Urges Repatriation’.
76 ibid.
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fingers’ and engage instead in dialogue.77 Indonesia then criticised the oic for 
‘constantly making harsh statements without taking any concrete actions in 
handling [the] Rohingya minority in Myanmar’.78
By 2019, the oic’s approach had become too confrontational and inter-
ventionist towards Myanmar for Jowoki’s administration, as illustrated by 
statements made at the 2019 unga.79 Here, Indonesia revised the draft UN 
resolution sponsored by the oic and the EU, in order to retain ‘balance’ and 
to recognise Myanmar’s ‘own efforts to address the issue’, as well as empha-
sising the role of asean, via what Indonesia perceived as the need to search 
for a long-term solution with Myanmar.80 This sort of intervention at the UN 
highlights Indonesia’s preference for quiet diplomacy to preserve overall rela-
tions with Myanmar, and maintain access to humanitarian aid for remaining 
Rohingya communities in Rakhine State.
Overall, then, while Indonesia acted as a bridge between the oic and 
Myanmar, especially over providing humanitarian aid to the Rohingya,81 it 
diverged from the oic’s eventual position over pursuing international justice 
against Myanmar. Our analysis has shown that the government was willing to 
accommodate some of the demands of Islamic humanitarianism from national 
Islamic organisations, as long as they focused on humanitarian aid, which pac-
ified these organisations to some extent.82 However, the government stopped 
short of meeting more confrontational demands linked to political reform and 
political rights. Indonesia therefore deviated from the line taken by the oic –  
which came to reflect core dimensions of R2P. Towards Myanmar, this quiet 
diplomacy mirrors the Indonesian government’s domestic approach to man-
aging conflicts between ethno-nationalist minorities and the military, as dis-
cussed in the following section.83
77 Dian Septiari, ‘Indonesia Defends Approach to Rohingya Problem as International 
Pressure Mounts’, The Jakarta Post, 18 November 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2019/11/18/indonesia-defends-approach-to-rohingya-problem-as-international-
pressure-mounts.html#_=_, accessed 20 July 2020.
78 Santi, ‘Indonesia Criticizes oic’.
79 Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’; ga/shc/4282, 14 November 2019; Morada, 
‘Continuing Violence and Atrocities’, p. 81.
80 Septiari, ‘Indonesia Defends Approach’; Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
official, 15 September 2020.
81 oic/acm-2019/CG-ROHINGYA/REPORT/FINAL, 25 September 2019; Associated Press, 
‘oic Hopes to Send Team to Myanmar to Study Rohingya’s Plight’.
82 ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, p. 6.
83 Claire Q. Smith, ‘Liberal and Illiberal Peace-Building in East Timor and Papua: Establishing 
Order in a Democratising State’, Conflict, Security & Development, 20(1) 39–70 (2020).
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3 Domestic Constraints: The Legacies of Indonesia’s Political 
Transition
Despite domestic and international pressures from Islamic organisations 
to take greater action to protect the Rohingya minority, Indonesia’s position 
towards Myanmar was influenced by deep-rooted domestic and regional con-
straints. Some of these were legacies of Indonesia’s own 20-year transition 
from a military regime. When the Indonesian democratisation process started 
in 1998, following widespread civil protests after the economic crisis of 1997, 
the new regime initially had widespread international support. However, this 
turned sour over escalating military violence in East Timor, with the interna-
tional community eventually reaching agreement with Indonesia to accept a 
UN peacekeeping operation in the territory.84 The UN’s response to the East 
Timor crisis left a lasting political impact on the Indonesian political elite.85 
This was to underpin the Indonesian government’s position that fellow 
Southeast Asian states’ political processes, national sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity should be respected over the next two decades.86
Indonesia’s domestic approach to managing post-authoritarian civil–mili-
tary relations during democratisation, following the East Timor debacle, took 
the form of what scholars (but not the government) dubbed ‘illiberal peace-
building’. The approach focused on economic and social improvements, along 
with technical governance reforms, while avoiding substantive civil and legal 
reforms, which would have directly confronted the interests of political and 
military elites, thereby threatening political stability.87 Indonesia perceived 
that its domestic approach to conflict management during a turbulent tran-
sition was directly relevant to Myanmar’s transition process, which entailed 
gradual reform to (rather than confrontation with) the military’s role in pol-
itics as a means of preserving overall order.88 Three issues in particular have 
84 Marianne Jago, ‘interfet: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor’, 
International Peacekeeping, 17(3) 377–94 (2010); Grayson J. Lloyd, ‘The Diplomacy on East 
Timor, the United Nations and International Community’, in James J. Fox and Dionislo 
Babo Soares (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor 
(Canberra, anu E Press, 2003); Geoffrey Robinson, If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die: How 
Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009).
85 Claire Q. Smith and Tom Jarvis, ‘Ending Mass Atrocities: An Empirical Reinterpretation of 
“Successful” International Military Intervention in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, 
25(1) 1–27 (2018).
86 Smith, ‘Illiberal Peace-Building in Hybrid Political Orders’.
87 ibid.; Smith, ‘Liberal and Illiberal Peace-Building in East Timor and Papua’.
88 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
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defined Indonesia’s experience of democratic transition, and frame their pol-
icy towards Myanmar: managing civil–military relations without alienating 
the military; dealing with the legacies of international intervention in East 
Timor; and managing enduring ethno-nationalist conflicts.89
3.1 Managing Civil–Military Relations
When Indonesia moved into a formal transition to democracy in 1998, signifi-
cant nationwide reforms took place, including removing the military from par-
liament, where it had held a central role for nearly thirty years, and expanding 
the freedoms of civil society, the media, and the judiciary.90 The transition to 
democracy was also accompanied by widespread conflict, including the esca-
lation of violence between the military and ethno-religious minorities in bor-
derland regions and disputed territories. The military remained powerful and 
frequently unaccountable in these regions, with human rights abuses contin-
uing throughout nationwide democratisation processes.91 The military’s role 
in these areas posed the greatest challenge to overall democratisation and this 
issue was treated with great caution by successive governments, even through 
internationally brokered peace processes, such as in Aceh.92 Indonesia’s 
support for Myanmar’s military-driven democratisation process – which 
has provided only partial reform for the military sector and avoids military 
accountability – aligns with Indonesia’s own longer-term and non-confronta-
tional democratisation approach.93
Maintaining national stability during democratic transition was a major 
challenge for Indonesia, but the government eventually successfully ended 
89 On the parallels between the two countries’ transition processes, see also, Rosyidin, 
‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 32. On whether Myanmar’s military intended 
substantive democratic reform, see Kristian Stokke and Soe Myint Aung, ‘Transition to 
Democracy or Hybrid Regime? The Dynamics and Outcomes of Democratisation in 
Myanmar’, The European Journal of Development Research, 32(2) 274–293 (2019). See also 
Kristian Stokke, ‘Political Representation by Ethnic Parties? Electoral Performance and 
Party-Building Processes among Ethnic Parties in Myanmar’, Journal of Current Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 38(3) 307–336 (2020). On regional peacebuilding dynamics during political 
transition, see Smith et al., ‘Illiberal Peace-Building in Asia’.
90 Louay Abdulbaki, ‘Democratisation in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation’, Asian 
Journal of Political Science, 16(2) 151–172 (2008).
91 Jacques Bertrand, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Indonesia: National Models, Critical Junctures, and 
the Timing of Violence’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 8(3) 425–449 (2008).
92 Terence Lee, ‘Political Orders and Peace-building: Ending the Aceh Conflict’, Conflict, 
Security & Development, 20(1) 115–139 (2020).
93 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
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multiple conflicts, including the long-running separatist conflict in Aceh.94 
Even after the majority of ethnic and separatist violence had waned, the scale 
of Indonesia’s military and its influence in domestic politics remained large for 
a democratic state. The military also maintained a large role in the economy, 
a dominant role in the security of several borderland locations, and ongoing 
influence over broader domestic security.95 The military also blocked the inves-
tigation of military crimes committed during Suharto’s regime (1967–1998).96 
These trends threatened military and political reforms, and during 20 years 
of transition, successive civilian governments have failed to confront military 
impunity over past and ongoing human rights and war crimes.97 While human 
rights and democratic conditions improved for many, the rights of several 
minority groups remained at risk.98
The enduring nature of military impunity in Indonesia, through 20 years 
of democratisation, underpins the government’s unwillingness to confront 
Myanmar directly over military atrocities against Rohingya, and its preference 
for working cooperatively with the Myanmar military and wider government. 
As such, Indonesia’s military has held training exercises with Myanmar’s mili-
tary, the Tatmadaw, since the reform process began in 2011.99 This military train-
ing is intended to create ‘sustainable reform’ in Myanmar’s military, ‘sharing 
practices and lessons’ from Indonesia’s own experience of gradual reform.100
The experience of two conflicts in particular has meant Indonesia is resist-
ant to international criticism of human rights abuses in what it perceives as 
domestic affairs: East Timor, where the UN intervened in 1999; and the Papua 
region, where conflict continued in 2020. It is worth outlining both of these 
cases in some detail, as it helps explain Indonesia’s reluctance to confront 
Myanmar’s atrocity crimes more publicly and via international fora.
3.2 Legacies of International Intervention in East Timor
Indonesia’s wariness of international interventions against atrocities stems 
from its experience in East Timor, one year after formal democratisation 
94 Lee, ‘Political Orders and Peace-building’.
95 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, 
Politics, and Power (Santa Monica: rand Corporation, 2002).
96 Katharine McGregor, ‘Exposing Impunity: Memory and Human Rights Activism in 
Indonesia and Argentina’, Journal of Genocide Research, 19(4) 551–573 (2017).
97 Katherine McGregor, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman, The Indonesian Genocide of 1965 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
98 Amnesty International, Indonesia: “Don’t Bother Just Let Him Die”: Killing with Impunity in 
Papua, asa/21/8198/2018, 2 July 2018.
99 ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, p. 12. See also Prasetyo, ‘Indonesia Calls on oic’.
100 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
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began. At that time, escalating violence between the military, military-spon-
sored militia, and civilians in East Timor led to the UN and other international 
bodies agreeing to a UN peacekeeping operation. This took place with eventual 
Indonesian agreement and Indonesian military withdrawal, and led to East 
Timor’s formal independence in 2002.101 While celebrated as a human rights 
and democracy victory in the international community, these events had the 
reverse effect on Indonesian national politics, and coloured how the govern-
ment subsequently responded to other minority groups claiming rights and 
independence. It has also underscored the popular perception that foreign 
states sought to undermine Indonesia’s national territorial integrity during the 
early days of democratisation.102
When newly installed democratic President Habibie (1998-1999) took the 
decision to allow a referendum on East Timor’s status in 1999, he did so with-
out political or military consultation on this decision.103 East Timor was for-
cibly occupied by Indonesia in 1975, but their claim to the territory was never 
recognised by the UN. Throughout the Suharto regime, East Timorese organ-
isations lobbied for independence via military and civilian means.104 One of 
Habibie’s first major decisions in office was to gain international democratic 
credibility by enabling a referendum on East Timor’s status.105 The military 
leadership rejected Habibie’s decision, and generated violence across the ter-
ritory of East Timor in an attempt to force a remain vote. The method failed 
and, with escalating violence, Indonesia reluctantly allowed UN intervention 
and ordered military withdrawal in late 1999. The East Timor affair brought 
Habibie into direct conflict with most of the military leadership and many in 
the political elite, and his political career did not survive: shortly afterwards, 
Habibie lost the presidency.106
The lasting shame among the political and military elite caused by the East 
Timor incident, even among many pro-reform leaders, underpinned an endur-
ing scepticism towards international interventions in arenas seen as nationally 
sovereign.107 This perspective played a key role in the government’s aversion to 
101 Jago, ‘interfet’; Lloyd, ‘The Diplomacy on East Timor’; Robinson, If You Leave Us Here.
102 Smith, ‘Liberal and Illiberal Peace-Building in East Timor and Papua’.
103 Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘The East Timor Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian 
Politics’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(4) 77–82 (2001); Smith and Jarvis, ‘Ending 
Mass Atrocities’.
104 Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for 
Freedom (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002).
105 Smith and Jarvis, ‘Ending Mass Atrocities’.
106 ibid.
107 Smith and Jarvis, ‘Ending Mass Atrocities’.
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publicly supporting international condemnation and collective action – both 
judicial and otherwise – via invoking the R2P norm against Myanmar. Although 
no major international actors had recommended international military inter-
vention in Rakhine State, the existence of such a possibility under R2P pillar 
three underpinned the Indonesian government’s resistance to such measures.
3.3 Managing Enduring Ethno-nationalist Conflict
The other most politically sensitive conflict in Indonesia since democratisa-
tion – and where the government has resisted international investigations 
since East Timor’s independence – has been the enduring problem of ethno- 
nationalism and violence in the Papua region.108 The civil war in Papua effec-
tively ended in the 1980s, with the wide-scale military defeat of separatist 
armed groups. The conflict then continued mainly via civilian means, but 
security sector violence against civilians continued for a further forty years, 
alongside sporadic attacks by armed organisations against state security out-
posts. By 2020, Indonesia had been unable to resolve the conflict, but contin-
ued to reject international pressure to allow UN and human rights observers 
into the region, much as Myanmar has done over Rakhine state. Indonesia 
maintained that its territorial claim over Papua was upheld by the UN, follow-
ing the 1969 ‘Act of Free Choice’, ratified by the General Assembly.109 Despite 
many calls from West Papuans – organised under the global United Liberation 
Movement for West Papua (ulmwp) – for a new UN referendum on the sta-
tus of the territory, these had been unsuccessful by 2020 and the government 
sought to maintain their dominant position.110
Despite moves towards a more negotiated approach over the status of the 
Papuan territory in the early years of democratisation under President Wahid 
(1991–2001), these were ultimately rejected by both the civilian and military 
leadership following the East Timor crisis.111 An alternative conflict resolution 
approach, within the scope of ‘illiberal peacebuilding’, was brought into law 
108 The region is collectively known as West Papua by pro-independence organisations, and 
the Papua region by human rights and other observer groups.
109 For the definitive history of this process, see Pieter Droogleever, An Act of Free Choice: 
Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua (Oxford: OneWorld 
Publications, 2009).
110 The ulmwp refers to the 1969 law as the ‘Act of No Choice’. See Jason MacLeod, Merdeka 
and the Morning Star: Civil Resistance in West Papua (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 2015); Johnny Blades, ‘West Papua: The Issue That Won’t Go Away for Melanesia’, 
Lowy Institute, 1 May 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/west-papua-
issues-wont-go-away-melanesia, accessed on 16 September 2020.
111 Smith, ‘Liberal and Illiberal Peace-Building in East Timor and Papua’.
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between 2001 and 2004, with the implementation of ‘special autonomy’ for 
Papua, the decentralisation of government, and a range of budgetary reforms, 
increased infrastructure, and development spending.112 This approach to 
conflict management in Papua was embedded in Indonesia’s broader model 
of ‘illiberal’ peacebuilding, focused on socio-economic recovery, economic 
development, and technical reforms, and avoiding civil and political reforms. 
Illiberal peacebuilding in Papua is widely seen as having failed to reduce con-
flict or security sector violence towards the local population, and also failed to 
reduce systemic racism towards indigenous Papuans, which escalated nation-
wide in 2019.113 Nonetheless, Papua remained a part of territorial Indonesia 
without returning to civil war. For the government, at least, its peacebuilding 
approach to Papua had achieved its central goals of maintaining overall order 
and preventing renewed civil war.
Indonesia’s diplomatic approach towards Myanmar over the Rohingya cri-
sis was rooted in its support for Myanmar’s democratisation process, demon-
strating a ‘mutual understanding’ of its transition.114 Promoting itself as a role 
model for Myanmar, Indonesia has encouraged Myanmar’s transition with ref-
erence to its own recent experiences of managing peace processes and grad-
ual military reform.115 These domestic experiences have restricted Indonesia’s 
capacity to address mass atrocities in negotiated ways.116 They also underpin 
the humanitarian aid and economic development-based approach Indonesia 
has taken towards the Rohingya crisis, rooted in avoiding political interference 
in, or public criticism of, Myanmar’s atrocities. These domestic experiences 
have also reinforced the government’s support for asean’s key principles, as 
discussed next.
112 World Bank, Papua Public Expenditure Analysis: Overview Report, Regional Finance and 
Service Delivery in Indonesia’s Most Remote Region (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8322, accessed 16 September 2020.
113 Blades, ‘West Papua’.
114 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
115 Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 32; ipac, Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis, 
p. 1; Soe Myint, ‘Indonesian Ambassador Stresses Strong Ties on 70th Anniversary of 
Indonesia-Myanmar Relations’, Mizzima, 26 October 2019, http://mizzima.com/article/
indonesian-ambassador-stresses-strong-ties-70th-anniversary-indonesia-myanmar-
relations, accessed 6 June 2020.
116 Ririn Tri Nurhayati, ‘Assessing Indonesia’s Capacity for Addressing Mass Atrocities’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 12(4) 415–439 (2020); Claire Q. Smith, ‘Indonesia: Two Similar 
Civil Wars; Two Different Endings’ in Bridget Conley-Zilkic (ed.), How Mass Atrocities End: 
Studies from Guatemala, Burundi, Indonesia, the Sudans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iraq 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 83–120.
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4 Respecting the ‘asean Way’
Regional relations between Indonesia and Myanmar have been governed by 
the asean framework, which foregrounds the principles of non-interference 
in member states, the protection of national territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
and the ‘asean Way’ of consensus based decision-making.117 These principles 
have a strong influence over asean states given the history of colonisation 
across Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand. Throughout the crisis, 
Indonesia focused on working ‘in partnership’ with Myanmar, as part of the 
‘asean family’, to respond to the crisis.118
The Rohingya minority have not been recognised as citizens of Myanmar, a 
problem that lies at the root causes of the human rights violations they have 
suffered.119 asean has referred to them throughout the crisis as ‘Bengalis’, 
in effect agreeing with Myanmar’s definition of the Rohingya’s ethnic, and 
therefore (in this case) political identity.120 The Indonesian government also 
failed to challenge this position. Instead, it has cooperated with Myanmar 
via asean through two main arenas: humanitarian assistance and economic 
development.
4.1 Humanitarian Assistance
As we have outlined, Indonesia has mainly pursued a humanitarian approach 
to dealing with the Rohingya crisis, rather than addressing the political nature 
of the violence via public confrontations with the government.121 There were 
some exceptions to this, for example when Retno Marsudi urged Myanmar to 
minimise the use of force, but overall the government stuck to the human-
itarian focused agenda.122 In November 2019 at the asean summit, Jokowi 
publicly committed to support those affected by violence in Rakhine State.123 
The Foreign Ministry made a grant to the asean Secretariat to help repatriate 
117 Morada, ‘asean and the Rakhine Crisis’, p. 3.
118 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
119 Stokke and Soe Myint Aung, ‘Transition to Democracy or Hybrid Regime?’, p. 288.
120 John Zaw, ‘asean Leaders Pressured over Leaked Rohingya Repatriation Report’, South 
Asia Journal, 24 June 2019, http://southasiajournal.net/asean-leaders-pressured-over-
leaked-rohingya-repatriation-report/, accessed 5 July 2020. See also Burma Human Rights 
Network (bhrn), ‘A Whitewash’, 20 June 2019, http://bhrn.org.uk/en/statement/1085-a-
whitewash.html, accessed 5 July 2020.
121 Cook and Nathini, Pathways for ASEAN Contributions, pp. 7–11; ipac, Indonesia and the 
Rohingya Crisis, p. 2.
122 Difa and Kurmala, ‘Indonesia Gives Grant’; Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’.
123 asean, ‘Indonesia Funds US$500,000 to Support ASEAN Efforts in the Repatriation of 
Displaced Persons in Myanmar’, ASEAN Secretariat News, 20 December 2019, https://asean.
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refugees from Cox’s Bazar refugee camp in Bangladesh to Myanmar.124 The 
asean Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (aha), along with 
the asean-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (erat), focused on ‘capaci-
ty-building’, ‘strengthening information circulation’, and ‘supporting the provi-
sion of basic services’.125 This approach fitted with broader asean principles.126 
It also demonstrated Indonesia’s role as Myanmar’s ‘most trusted partner in the 
region’, giving Indonesia privileged ‘access to both diplomatic and humanitar-
ian measures in assisting the Myanmar government to deal with the issue’.127 
Indonesia’s access to Myanmar, and the positive reception to its Islamic ngo s 
providing aid, flowed from this non-confrontational approach.128
Indonesia also brokered meetings between different parties seeking to pro-
vide aid. In 2017, for example, Indonesia facilitated a meeting with Aung San 
Suu Kyi, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and both the Bangladesh 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.129 Indonesia also convinced Myanmar 
to participate in the ‘asean Retreat’ – a ministerial meeting in Yangon in 
December 2016, which resulted in an agreement over the provision of human-
itarian aid from asean members to all communities in Rakhine.130 For the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry, the combination of aid provision and dialogue 
facilitation formed part of a longer-term peacebuilding approach that avoided 
confrontation and conflict escalation.
4.2 Local Economic Development
The Indonesian government also provided economic development funding for 
Rakhine State, such as financing post-conflict infrastructure projects, as part 
of its peacebuilding support to Myanmar.131 This strategy helped maintain 
org/indonesia-funds-us500000-support-asean-efforts-repatriation-displaced-persons-
myanmar/, accessed 15 July 2020.
124 ibid.
125 Difa and Kurmala, ‘Indonesia Gives Grant’.
126 Morada, ‘asean and the Rakhine Crisis’, p. 3.
127 Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 34.
128 Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’; Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
official, 15 September 2020.
129 Chandni Vatvani, ‘Indonesian Foriegn Minister Retno Marsudi to Meet Aung San Suu Kyi 
in Myanmar’, Channel News Asia, 3 September 2017, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/
news/asia/indonesian-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi-to-meet-aung-san-suu-9181862, 
accessed 28 August 2020.
130 Radio Free Asia, ‘Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Discusses Rakhine Crisis with asean Foreign 
Ministers’, Refworld, 19 December 2016, https://www.refworld.org/docid/58f9ca0710.html, 
accessed 25 August 2020.
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Indonesian access to Rakhine State while not antagonising the Myanmar gov-
ernment, as it avoided reference to more substantive reforms.132 Further, the 
Indonesian Ambassador to Myanmar stated in 2019, ‘Indonesia would like 
to increase cooperation in the economic field as part of government policy 
to strengthen economic diplomacy’.133 The Indonesian government claimed 
this strategy formed part of a localised peacebuilding approach.134 At best, 
the strategy enabled access to Rakhine State, which may have mitigated some 
of the effects of the atrocities. At worst, this approach may have exacerbated 
conflict, as public infrastructure projects have tended to generate conflict in 
Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State.135
In broader strategic terms, economic investments in Myanmar also pro-
vided a way for Indonesia to maintain its relationship with the government, 
which was moving closer to China. Although economic relations between 
Myanmar and China had cooled in 2011, they subsequently signed several 
multi-billion dollar development packages, securing China’s role as one of the 
dominant regional players in Myanmar.136 China also expanded the Belt and 
Road Initiative into Myanmar and formed the China–Myanmar Economic 
Corridor, along with supporting Myanmar’s overall peace process.137 By 
maintaining a cooperative role with Myanmar throughout the Rohingya cri-
sis, Indonesia preserved a close regional alliance, while Myanmar was being 
courted by China. Their close regional alliance was of greater strategic impor-
tance than confronting Myanmar too directly over their treatment of the 
131 Asep Setiawan and Hamka, ‘Role of Indonesian Humanitarian Diplomacy’. See also Smith, 
‘Illiberal Peace-Building in Hybrid Political Orders’; Smith et al., ‘Illiberal Peace-Building in 
Asia’.
132 Soe Myint, ‘Indonesian Ambassador Stresses Strong Ties’.
133 ibid.; Jieun Pyun, ‘Myanmar Open for Business, But Not Rohingya’, The Diplomat, 25 
February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/myanmar-open-for-business-but-not-
rohingya/, accessed 25 August 2020.
134 Interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 15 September 2020.
135 Further research would be required to establish the effects of the development funds. 
On infrastructure in Myanmar, see Adam Burke, Nicola Williams, Patrick Barron, Kim 
Jolliffe, and Thomas Carr, The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, 
and Development (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2017), p. 4; Emma Palmer, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect and Infrastructure in Myanmar’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 
12(1) 86–114 (2020), pp. 90, 104.
136 Keith Johnson, ‘China Leaps into Breach between Myanmar and West’, Foreign Policy, 29 
January 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/29/china-leaps-between-myanmar-west-
india-xi-visit/, accessed 17 August 2020.
137 ibid. See also Monish Tourangbam and Pawan Amin, ‘China’s Dynamic Grip on Myanmar’, 
The Diplomat, 7 May 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/chinas-dynamic-grip-on-
myanmar/, accessed 21 July 2020.
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Rohingya. With these interests in mind, Indonesia pursued the asean mode 
of quiet diplomacy, concentrated on humanitarian, technical, and economic 
assistance, rather than taking the more confrontational route of the oic.138
Although asean states were generally reluctant to directly confront human 
rights issues, several scholars have argued that asean remained an important 
regional forum to pursue human rights goals.139 However, the ‘asean Way’ has 
resulted in what Rosyidin terms the ‘action-identity gap’, where asean states 
adopt policies to ensure compliance with international human rights commit-
ments, but face few consequences for violating these norms at the regional 
or national level.140 For instance, the former asean Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (aichr) representative from Indonesia, Dinna 
Wisnu, contradicted Indonesia’s official position on the Rakhine crisis in 2018, 
encouraging the aichr and asean to respond more directly.141 Yet the asean 
Political Security Community and the aichr have, collectively, taken no con-
crete action to stop violence against the Rohingya following the escalation of 
violence in 2017, maintaining a soft diplomatic approach.142
5 Can ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ and R2P Be Reconciled? Concluding 
Remarks
Our paper has contributed to the (so far) limited research on the role of 
Southeast Asian states in the Rohingya crisis, by analysing Indonesia’s quiet 
diplomacy towards Myanmar. It has thereby also contributed to understanding 
138 Irawan Jati, ‘Comparative Study of the Roles of asean and the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation in Responding to the Rohingya Crisis’, IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1(1) 17–32 (2017), p. 19.
139 Hiro Katsumata, ‘asean and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating 
the West?’, The Pacific Review, 22(5) 619–637 (2009); Mathew Davies, ‘Important but 
De-centred: asean’s Role in the Southeast Asian Human Rights Space’, TRaNS: Trans-
Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 5(1) 99–119 (2017), p. 100; Rosyidin, 
‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 28.
140 Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty’, p. 14.
141 Dinna Wisnu and Edmund Bon Tai Soon, ‘Joint Media Statement’, 23 April 2018, https://
maruahsg.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/20180423-joint-media-statement-aichr-indonesia-
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some of the broader limitations of R2P. Despite initial expectations that 
Indonesia – with its active Islamic civil society and commitment to R2P at 
international fora – would respond more critically to Myanmar, the govern-
ment avoided invoking R2P, and only intervened in the crisis with Myanmar’s 
cooperation. Indonesia followed a careful middle path to balance competing 
domestic and regional factors.
We have shown how, as military atrocities escalated against the Rohingya 
population, Indonesian civil society organisations directly invoked R2P and 
called on the government to do more to protect them. Large national Islamic 
organisations also called for an Islamic humanitarian response, both to accept 
Rohingya as refugees in Indonesia, and to facilitate access to aid. However, 
when Islamic organisations and oic member states labelled the treatment of 
Rohingya as ‘genocide’, the government refused to take the same position. A 
key challenge for Indonesia was responding to national pressure from many 
powerful Islamic organisations, while avoiding an overtly critical position of 
Myanmar, which it saw as counterproductive.
The compromise was found via a twofold response to Myanmar. First, the 
government recognised fleeing Rohingya as refugees – having initially treated 
them as migrants – facilitated their access to humanitarian aid, and made 
repeated calls for their safe repatriation. Second, the government enabled 
access for Indonesian Islamic charity groups into Myanmar. Both steps aligned 
with a quiet diplomacy approach towards Myanmar, while satisfying domestic 
moderate Islamic groups, and pacifying, to a degree, the more militant Islamic 
organisations.
The quiet diplomacy approach derived not only from Indonesia’s goal of 
maintaining relations with Myanmar, but from Indonesia’s own recent polit-
ical transition. The government took the view that Indonesia’s democratisa-
tion processes, especially around reconfiguring civil–military relations, bore 
many similarities to Myanmar’s transition. The legacy of UN intervention in 
East Timor in 1999 also remained influential on the Indonesian political elite 
twenty years later. Further, Indonesia’s domestic model of peacebuilding dur-
ing democratisation prioritised political order over military accountability for 
past and ongoing crimes. The ‘illiberal peacebuilding’ model – based on coop-
eration with the military and providing technical reforms and economic goods 
to conflict affected areas, rather than substantive political or civil reforms – 
constrained Indonesia from putting more overt pressure on Myanmar to pro-
tect the Rohingya, despite increased advocacy from Islamic groups. Overall, 
quiet diplomacy drove the focus onto humanitarian assistance to Rohingya 
across the region, and local reconstruction within Myanmar.
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The ‘asean Way’ of conducting diplomatic affairs, underscoring non-inter-
ference, collaboration with regional allies, and consensus-based decision-mak-
ing, acted as a further brake on Indonesia’s position towards Myanmar. While 
Indonesia remained engaged with the oic, its commitment to asean was ulti-
mately more important throughout Jokowi’s presidency. This meant Indonesia 
distanced itself from an increasingly critical and active oic towards the end of 
the 2010s, avoiding direct reference to R2P principles.
While the Indonesian government paid lip service to R2P at the UN, it 
resisted publicly invoking the norm over Myanmar’s atrocities. In particular, 
due to its own recent political history in East Timor, Indonesia held a dim 
view of pillar three interventions. Although international military interven-
tion in Rakhine State was never a real possibility (as no major international 
actor had suggested it, and it would likely have faced veto in the Security 
Council),143 the existence of such a possibility under pillar three underpinned 
Indonesia’s hesitancy to invoke R2P at all. The Foreign Ministry also saw that 
taking any such position would undermine humanitarian access to Myanmar: 
this fear was confirmed when the oic’s position hardened, restricting oic 
states’ humanitarian access to Rakhine State. Instead, Indonesia worked 
across Islamic and secular civil society groups, and bilateral and regional 
organisations, to deliver aid while maintaining its role as a ‘trusted partner’ 
with Myanmar. This approach fulfilled Indonesia’s goal of cooperating with 
the Myanmar government to support democratisation and (illiberal) peace-
building in Myanmar, seeing this as the most viable route to improving the 
situation for Rohingya in the long-term.
While Indonesia’s position and actions failed to prevent atrocities – or to 
challenge the root causes of anti-Rohingya violence, particularly Myanmar’s 
denial of Rohingya citizenship – the government did not remain completely 
silent. Indonesia supported the asean call for impartial investigation into 
atrocities in Rakhine by the ICoE, voted for the 2017 and 2018 unga resolutions 
to report on human rights violations in Myanmar, and supported the ffmm. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of Rohingya as refugees within Indonesia, and 
calls for the safe repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar, directly contradicted 
the Myanmar government’s position. Given the constraints Indonesia faced, 
these statements and actions were important steps towards a more public 
rebuke of Myanmar’s actions in the wider context of quiet diplomacy, but they 
were as far as Indonesia would go.
143 Simon Adams, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Fate of the Rohingya’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 11(4) 435–450 (2019), p. 444.
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Indonesia’s quiet diplomatic approach towards Myanmar’s treatment of 
the Rohingya avoided questioning the role of the military – which remained 
unaccountable to the elected government. This approach risked deepen-
ing Myanmar’s hybrid regime,144 rather than supporting substantive demo-
cratic reforms. But as this had been Indonesia’s own approach to managing 
democratisation, it is hard to see how it could have supported an alternative 
approach in Myanmar. For Indonesia, as with many transitional states, manag-
ing civilian conflict with a formerly all-powerful military, managing enduring 
ethno-nationalist conflicts, and seeking to secure overall political order (with 
its associated costs of violence against minorities) took precedence over more 
substantive reforms.
Indonesia’s approach to the Rohingya crisis points to some important les-
sons for the R2P doctrine, in the face of deep-rooted political and historical 
constraints. First, the Indonesian case shows that the specific political and 
historical context of a state shapes its response to atrocity crimes, despite 
stated international commitments to R2P. Supporting Myanmar via bilateral 
and regional cooperation, and providing aid to violence affected communi-
ties, rather than invoking R2P, was the logical path for Indonesia’s govern-
ment. It met their domestic and regional interests while mitigating some of 
the pressures from Islamic organisations to take action to aid the Rohingya. 
International expectations on Indonesia to do more than this failed to grasp 
the significance of Indonesia’s domestic experience of democratic transition 
and the importance of its regional alliances. These factors drove the govern-
ment’s non-interventionary and long-term approaches to diplomatic relations 
with Myanmar, despite concerns over the Rohingya population. R2P debates 
need to take serious account of such domestic constraints in assessing the 
potential of invoking the doctrine.
We have argued that the Indonesian response to the Myanmar atrocities 
was not a failure to act, but instead reflected a type of action that attempted to 
avoid driving Myanmar towards a more hard-line position over the Rohingya, 
while maintaining political and humanitarian access. Rather than conclud-
ing that Indonesia’s approach to mitigating atrocities against the Rohingya 
failed on all counts, the specific political context of their approach and their 
unique role in the crisis needs recognising. Indonesia played a distinct bridg-
ing role across domestic, regional and international organisations, within 
the constrained political circumstances it faced. Added to this, Indonesia 
saw non-cooperative international action as having limited practical effects 
on the situation of the Rohingya.
144 Stokke and Soe Myint Aung, ‘Transition to Democracy or Hybrid Regime?’
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Debates on R2P need to consider the efficacy of attempts at mitigating the 
effects of atrocities via maintaining long-term relationships with the state in 
question. With long-term prevention an integral part of the larger R2P frame-
work,145 the Indonesian case generates interesting avenues for exploring 
whether and how such prevention can be reconciled with other strategic inter-
ests.146 While quiet diplomacy, as well as other efforts, failed to prevent the 
atrocities of 2017 and beyond,147 the approach could form part of a future solu-
tion. With international, regional, and local organisations working towards the 
rehabilitation of surviving Rohingya communities, and the prevention of fur-
ther atrocities, Indonesia also plays an important role by maintaining an open 
diplomatic door. As civil-military relations in Myanmar deteriorate further in 
2021, the bridging role of states like Indonesia, who maintained close diplo-
matic ties with Myanmar throughout the Rohingya crisis, only become more 
relevant for minority protection.
145 Ban Ki-moon, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877–S/2011/393, 28 June 2011, p. 6; António Guterres, 
Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action, A/72/884–S/2018/525, 1 June 
2018, p. 4; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), Fostering 
Investment in Infrastructure: Lessons learned from oecd Investment Policy Reviews, January 
2015, p. 11.
146 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect in the Asia Pacific: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges, October 2019.
147 Adams, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Fate of the Rohingya’.
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